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Fichte and Hegel on Recognition and Slavery 
David James 
 
In Hegel’s Jena-period writings are to be found some extended critical discussions of Fichte’s 
philosophy. These writings include his Differenzschrift from 1801, in which the foundation of 
Fichte’s system is said to be the identity of subject and object achieved in the ‘pure thinking 
of itself’ of self-consciousness that finds expression in the statement of identity I = I (Ich = 
Ich). 1  This identity of self-consciousness is contrasted with the moment of non-identity 
encountered in the opposition between the subject and the object of consciousness. Fichte 
uses the term the ‘not-I’ (nicht-Ich) to designate this object which the I posits in opposition to 
itself and which must be introduced to explain the possibility of consciousness of the world. 
According to Hegel, Fichte’s philosophical system ultimately fails to overcome the 
opposition between the identity of the ‘pure’ or ‘transcendental’ consciousness of the first 
principle of his Foundation of the Entire Science of Knowledge that the I posits itself 
absolutely and the non-identity of its second principle that the I posits absolutely something 
opposed to itself.  
According to Hegel, although Fichte tries to bring about a synthesis of these two 
principles by means of the third principle that in the I a divisible I is opposed to a divisible 
not-I, his failure to explain this synthesis results in pure self-consciousness and its pure self-
knowledge standing opposed to an infinite objective world and knowledge of this world. For 
Hegel, this unresolved opposition between the ‘subjective I’ and the ‘objective I’ is not a 
purely cognitive matter, for he implies that this separation of subject and object together with 
their opposition to each other are unnatural, in the sense that the subject and object are 
ultimately identical with each other and thus belong together at the same time as they are 
non-identical. Yet Fichte is unable to comprehend this non-identity in such a way that the 
self-conscious subject is able to know itself in the object and thereby identify itself with it. 
The subjective I must, therefore, experience a sense of alienation through its being confronted 
by something that it takes to be entirely other than itself.  
Hegel speaks of a need for philosophy generated by the type of division or 
‘diremption’ (Entzweiung) typical of modern culture, and which manifests itself in forms of 
opposition that include this one between absolute subjectivity and absolute objectivity – 
indeed, this opposition is the most fundamental one - and he identifies the unique interest of 
reason with the attempt to suspend or ‘sublate’ (aufzuheben) such oppositions.2 This cannot 
be achieved, however, by means of a purely theoretical relation to the object. Rather, a 
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practical relation to the object must also be established, as Fichte himself maintains in his 
Foundation of the Entire Science of Knowledge when he claims that there is a necessary 
transition from the theoretical standpoint in which the I posits itself as determined by the not-
I to the practical standpoint in which the I posits itself as determining the not-I. This practical 
need helps explain Hegel’s claim that in Fichte’s system: ‘The I does not find itself in its 
appearance [Erscheinung], or in its positing; it must annul [zernichten] its appearance in 
order to find itself as I. The essence of the I and its positing do not coincide: I does not 
become objective to itself’.3  
As well as forming part of Hegel’s critique of Fichte’s philosophy, we shall see that 
this idea of a practical need and the relation between subject and object that explains the 
existence of this need also play a central role in Hegel’s account of the attempt made by self-
consciousness to posit itself as identical with the object of its consciousness in the struggle 
for recognition provided in his Phenomenology of Spirit from 1807. In the Phenomenology of 
Spirit Hegel develops the idea of a practical need to overcome the opposition between subject 
and object by showing how this need results in an attempt on the part of the subjective I to 
destroy the object confronting it. This attempt to overcome the opposition between subject 
and object fails, however, and Hegel introduces the concept of recognition to explain how 
this opposition can be overcome. This appeal to the concept of recognition is another sign of 
the importance of Fichte’s influence on Hegel, because this concept plays a central role in 
Fichte’s deduction of the concept of right (Recht), which forms the first main division of his 
Foundations of Natural Right (§§ 1-4). It is arguably in the Phenomenology of Spirit, then, 
and especially in Hegel’s account of the struggle for recognition and how can be overcome, 
that we encounter his most productive engagement with Fichte’s philosophy.4 
In the first section of this essay I show how Hegel’s account of the struggle for 
recognition can be explained in terms of the role that Fichte accords to recognition in his 
deduction of the concept of right and, in particular, in terms of a problem to which this 
deduction gives rise. In the second section, I show how Hegel seeks to resolve this problem 
by means of his account of the struggle for recognition. Finally, in the third section, I show 
how Fichte’s and Hegel’s claims concerning the necessity of mutual recognition do not 
prevent them from regarding slavery as justified in certain circumstances, or at least as being 
as much the fault of the person enslaved as the person who has enslaved him or her, despite 
the fact that slavery represents one of the clearest possible examples of a situation in which 
mutual recognition is absent. One may therefore question the extent to which they regard 
mutual recognition as an absolutely fundamental norm of social relations. There is the 
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difference, however, that Hegel’s position appears to be that mutual recognition becomes 
such a norm in the course of history, whereas Fichte implies that the absence of mutual 
recognition may be justified simply whenever an individual has failed to raise him- or herself 
to the level of a being whose attitude towards him- or herself as demonstrated through his or 
her actions is proof of a status that demands recognition from others.  
 
Recognition 
The struggle for recognition forms part of Hegel’s account of self-consciousness. This 
account begins with the pure identity of subject and object in which ‘there is indeed an 
otherness; that is to say, consciousness makes a distinction, but one which at the same time is 
for consciousness not a distinction’.5  Rather, the object (or content) of consciousness is 
simply the I which is conscious of itself and has become conscious of itself through its own 
act of thinking itself. In other words, the I qua subject of consciousness produces itself qua 
object of its own consciousness through the act of thinking itself. As Hegel puts it, ‘the “I” is 
the content of the connection and the connecting itself. Opposed to an other, the “I” is its own 
self, and at the same time it overarches this other which, for the “I”, is equally only the “I” 
itself’.6 The active terms in which Hegel describes this unity of subject and object within self-
consciousness (‘the “I” is … the connecting itself …. Opposed to an other, the “I” … at the 
same time … overarches this other’) seek to draw attention to the essential nature of the act 
of self-positing as already described by Fichte.  
For Fichte, the act of self-posting performed by the I is an act that is more 
fundamental than any other conscious act, because each and every other such act must be 
thought to be conditioned by this prior act, in the sense that every conscious act presupposes 
a subject or agent that performs it. Fichte identifies this ‘original’ act of the I with the concept 
of the I (GA I/6: 214-216; IWL, 44-46). The I is, in fact, to be understood as identical with 
the act by means of which it constitutes or ‘posits’ itself, and it does not, therefore, exist prior 
to and independently of this same act. Rather, the I’s existence cannot be separated from the 
act of self-constitution performed by the I itself, which means that the I ‘is at once the agent 
[das Handelnde] and the product of action; the active, and what the activity brings about; 
action [Handlung] and deed [That] are one and the same’ (GA I/2: 259; SK, 97).  
The idea that the I posits itself is meant to highlight, then, the way in which its own 
existence is immediately given through its act of thinking itself, so that, ‘To posit oneself and 
to be are, as applied to the self, perfectly identical’ (GA I/2: 260; SK, 99). The I that posits 
itself in this way is only a subjective I, however, since it is confronted with something other 
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than itself, a not-I, which it itself necessarily posits through an act of counter-positing. This 
not-I is therefore not completely independent of the I. Rather, each and every object of 
consciousness qua representation exists only in virtue of the unity of self-consciousness 
which is the condition of any act of representing whatsoever, and in this respect the I itself 
posits the not-I. Thus, although such an object of consciousness must be posited in order to 
explain the possibility of consciousness, the object of consciousness lacks genuine 
independence and reality. This helps explain why Hegel speaks of it as a matter of 
appearance.7  
In the Phenomenology of Spirit this moment of non-identity represents a problem 
precisely because it reduces knowledge to knowledge of appearances only and therefore lacks 
the status of true knowledge. This cognitive failure takes a practical form, in that the absence 
of the unity of subject and object, a unity in which both the identity and non-identity of these 
moments of knowledge are someone maintained, generates the need, and thereby the drive or 
urge (Trieb),8 to overcome the opposition between subject and object so as to reach the stage 
of true knowledge. In particular, self-consciousness seeks to satisfy this desire to overcome 
the opposition between itself and the object of its consciousness by means of a particular type 
of action, namely, that of removing the object’s independence by means of the act of 
consuming it. This way of establishing its identity with the object is, however, predicated on 
the existence of an independent object that can be destroyed in such a way as to establish the 
subject’s identity with it, whereas if the independence of the object were simply denied 
altogether, there would only be the immediate unity of self-consciousness. The object 
together with the desire to consume it must therefore be constantly reproduced. This is, in 
effect, to grant the necessity of the object’s independence in the face of self-consciousness, 
and thus to acknowledge the absolute non-identity of subject and object. 9  This process, 
through which the subject must repeatedly overcome the independence of the object, relates 
to a general criticism that Hegel makes of Fichte’s philosophy, which is that it generates a 
demand in the form of a moral postulate (ein Sollen) whose fulfilment must be perennially 
postponed simply because its goal, by its very nature, can never be realized.10  
According to Hegel, this problem can only be solved if the independence of the object 
is removed by means of an act of self-negation on the part of the object. Self-consciousness 
can, in short, ‘achieve satisfaction only when the object itself effects the negation within 
itself’.11 Yet what would represent such an act of self-negation? In attempting to answer this 
question, one might point to an essential contrast with desire. In the case of desire, self-
consciousness stands in a purely causal relation to the object, whereas in the case of this act 
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of self-negation there is no direct causal relation. Rather, the other or object of self-
consciousness freely performs the act of negation as opposed to simply being acted upon by 
the subject confronting it. It must, therefore, be a special kind of object, that is to say, one 
that is capable of performing this act of self-negation.  
Hegel identifies the essential characteristics of this act of self-negation when he states 
that: ‘Consciousness has for its object one which, of its own self, posits its otherness or 
difference as a nothingness, and in so doing is independent’.12 This statement tells us that the 
act of self-negation on the part of the object involves freely treating all differences between 
itself and the self-consciousness of which it is the object as somehow irrelevant or non-
existent, and that doing so is a sign of the object’s independence. This act of abstracting from 
all particular differences establishes an identity of the subject and the object of consciousness, 
in the sense that the former can regard the latter as being essentially the same as itself and, 
consequently, as not entirely other than itself. This identity must be achieved, however, in 
such a way that the object of consciousness retains its independence, for otherwise the 
identity in question would collapse into a mere self-identity of the subjective I, in which the 
moment of opposition between the subjective I and the objective I that is essential to 
explaining consciousness would be lost.  
Fichte’s account of mutual recognition as a necessary condition of self-consciousness 
in the Foundations of Natural Right helps explain this act of self-negation in such as a way as 
to incorporate the essential characteristics of this act described by Hegel. This leaves us with 
the question, however, as to why Hegel situates the act of self-negation on which mutual 
recognition depends within an account of a struggle for recognition, instead of arguing that 
this act of self-negation is by itself sufficient to establish the type of relation of mutual 
recognition that he himself describes as follows: ‘this absolute substance which is the unity of 
the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect 
freedom and independence’.13This question becomes more pressing because Hegel describes 
the immediate outcome of this struggle for recognition in terms of a relation in which 
domination is clearly present. Fichte’s account of recognition also provides the key to 
explaining this feature of Hegel’s account of recognition. This time, however, it is because 
Hegel is seeking to resolve a problem that arises in connection with Fichte’s deduction of the 
concept of right in so far as this deduction treats recognition as a necessary condition of a 
certain type of self-consciousness.  
Fichte’s deduction of the concept of right consists in an attempt to explain the 
possibility of self-consciousness in the form of the consciousness of oneself as a free and 
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rational agent capable of realizing one’s ends by effecting changes in the material world with 
which one is immediately confronted. In other words, the I posits itself by means of its world-
directed purposive activity. The I in question is a finite one whose activity is necessarily 
constrained by the object upon which it acts (‘a world’) because it is able to reflect only upon 
something limited (GA I/3: 329; FNR, 18-19). This particular act of self-positing is therefore 
one that underlies the I’s everyday conscious experience of itself as a rational being that wills 
in accordance with its representations of objects that limit its activity at the same time as it 
purposively acts upon them. By achieving this consciousness of itself as free and rational in 
relation to an independent object confronting it, a rational being overcomes the opposition 
between the subject and the object of consciousness at the same time as the independence of 
the object confronting it is acknowledged. In the first main division of the Foundations of 
Natural Right, Fichte goes further than this, however, by setting out an argument which 
purports to demonstrate that self-consciousness requires an object that qua object is 
independent of the subject but qua object of self-consciousness is not purely external to the 
subject. It is, in fact, identical with self-consciousness in the sense that it reflects what the 
subject itself essentially is, that is to say, self-determining. What we have is, in effect, a 
practical expression of the identity of subject and object presupposed by any conscious 
experience whatsoever, but which, as the condition of any such experience, can itself never 
become a direct object of experience.  
In the course of his deduction of the concept of right, Fichte comes to identify the 
object of consciousness with a ‘summons’ (or ‘request’, ‘demand’, ‘invitation’ as the German 
word Aufforderung can also be translated), by means of which the subject is determined to be 
self-determining (GA I/3: 342; FNR, 31). Here the subject’s activity is constrained by an 
independent object at the very same time as it remains self-determining. The second aspect of 
the summons is essential to Fichte’s account of how the following challenge can be met: 
given that the object of consciousness must be thought to be independent of the I, how can 
one reconcile the idea of a self-determining act on the part of a rational being that finds 
external confirmation of itself in the object of its consciousness with the idea of an 
independent object which stands opposed to this rational being and limits its activity?  
Fichte attempts to deal with this question by claiming that the summons presupposes 
both the capacity to act freely in accordance with ends on the part of the subject to which it is 
addressed and an understanding of what it means to act in such a way on the part of the 
subject that summons another subject to engage in free activity. Consequently, not only the 
subject to which the summons is addressed but also the subject that summons another subject 
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to act freely must be assumed to be free and rational (GA I/3: 345; FNR, 35). Here we begin 
to see why the recognition in question must be mutual. Fichte goes on to determine the 
precise nature of the relation between finite rational beings that this type of recognition 
entails. This relation is held to be one in which the freedom of each person is limited by the 
freedom of other persons in such a way that each person is left free to act within the limits 
granted to him or to her by others. This form of mutual limitation demands that each person is 
both a subject that summons others by means of an act of self-limitation and the object of a 
summons in the sense that others limit their activity in relation to it. Only by summoning 
others can each person demonstrate that he or she is a free and rational being to which a 
summons can be directed, and conversely it is only by being the object of such a summons 
that consciousness of oneself as a free and rational being becomes possible.  
Here the mutual nature of recognition becomes explicit: if I am to ‘posit’ myself as 
free and rational I must ‘summon’ others, and I can do this only by recognizing their identity 
with me in the sense of acknowledging that they are free and rational beings, just as I 
conceive of myself as such a being. It is not, however, a matter of exercising a purely causal 
influence on others with the aim of producing certain effects. Rather, ‘the relation of free 
beings to each other is a relation of reciprocal interaction through intelligence and freedom. 
One cannot recognize the other if both do not mutually recognize each other; and one cannot 
treat the other as a free being, if both do not mutually treat each other as free’ (GA I/3: 351; 
FNR, 42). The freedom in question is therefore not equivalent to the freedom that consists in 
abstracting from any natural, given determinations, even if it depends on such an act of 
abstraction which makes it possible to recognize others as being of the same general type as 
oneself. It is something more than this because it also consists in an act of self-limitation 
(Selbstbeschränkung), whereby each person freely imposes limits on him- or herself by 
restricting the sphere of his or her activity with a view to granting others the possibility of 
exercising their capacity for free choice (GA I/3: 350-351; FNR, 41). Nevertheless, the act of 
abstraction mentioned above together with the capacity to perform such an act remain 
conditions of this act of self-limitation, in that this second act is directed at a being that one 
already recognizes as free and rational like oneself. The first act, the one in which one 
abstracts from all differences, is, then, a condition of the possibility of mutual recognition.  
Fichte’s deduction of the concept of right can be seen to explain the essential features 
of Hegel’s notion of mutual recognition as a state of affairs in which ‘[e]ach sees the other do 
the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does 
what it does only in so far as the other does the same. Action by one side only would be 
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useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both’.14 To begin with, each 
person performs an act of self-negation by limiting his or her own activity for the sake of 
another person’s freedom. In limiting his or her activity in relation to others, each person 
respects the independence of others. 15  The logical and the practical impossibility of 
overcoming the independence of the object that becomes evident in the case of desire is thus 
accommodated within an account of how self-consciousness nevertheless overcomes the 
opposition between itself and the object of consciousness. At the same time, each person 
limits his or her activity in relation to others only in so far as they limit their activity in 
relation to him or to her, so that this overcoming of the opposition between the subject and 
the object of consciousness is possible only if the recognition is mutual. Finally, the act of 
self-negation represented by the summons involves treating all differences as irrelevant. It is, 
in short, in virtue of what persons have in common, as opposed to that which makes them 
into the particular individuals they are, that mutual recognition is possible at all. Why, then, 
does Hegel introduce a struggle for recognition, whereas Fichte does not? I want now to 
argue that this major difference can be explained with reference to a problem generated by 
the essential role that mutual recognition plays in Fichte’s deduction of the concept of right. 
 
The struggle for recognition 
As we have seen, it is only by summoning another person that each person demonstrates that 
he or she is a free and rational being to which a summons can be directed, and it is only by 
being the object of such a summons that consciousness of oneself as a free and rational being 
becomes possible. Clearly, the second requirement is more fundamental than the first one 
because the wish to demonstrate that one is a free and rational being presupposes that one is 
conscious of oneself as such a being, and this form of consciousness presupposes that one has 
at some point already been the recipient of a summons of the relevant kind. Fichte’s idea of a 
community of free and rational beings that reciprocally recognize each other as beings of the 
same general type in this way generates the following puzzle: how did such a community of 
free and rational beings come about when the first member of this community could not have 
achieved a consciousness of him- or herself as free and rational because he or she would not 
have been able to gain a determinate representation of him- or herself as such a being by 
means of a summons of the relevant kind? In the absence of a convincing answer to this 
question, one is left asking why the first human beings – none of whom was in a position to 
issue such a summons to others – did not instead remain merely natural beings driven by 
desire and instinct in such a way as to render them incapable of freely limiting their activity 
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in relation to others. In short, Fichte’s account of recognition presupposes certain capacities 
and powers whose existence has not been sufficiently explained in the case of the first human 
beings.  
Fichte demonstrates that he himself is aware of this problem when he identifies the 
summons to engage in free activity addressed to others not with any single action but with a 
whole series of actions, which he associates with the notion of upbringing or education 
(Erziehung) (GA I/3: 347; FNR, 38). This shows that for him freedom and rationality are the 
result of a process. Yet the idea of a process simply reproduces the problem mentioned 
above, in that it invites the question as to the origin of the kind of community in which the 
right type of educational process - that is to say, one that aims to produce in others a 
consciousness of themselves as essentially free and rational beings - first became possible. In 
other words, the question arises as to how the first members of this community were 
themselves educated to think of themselves in the required way and were thereby able to 
educate others with the aim of developing in them the same capacities and the same self-
conception. This leads Fichte to ask who brought up or educated the first human couple. He 
himself refers to the wisdom of the Genesis account of the care that God took of Adam and 
Eve, in which a rational being, though not a human one but a ‘spirit’, is described as having 
taken care of the first human couple (GA I/3: 347-348; FNR, 38). Fichte recognizes, then, 
that his account of recognition within the framework of a transcendental deduction of the 
conditions of self-consciousness ultimately needs to be supplemented by a genetic account of 
relations of mutual recognition. Hegel can be seen to replace Fichte’s appeal to Biblical 
narrative with a genetic account which begins with a struggle for recognition, making mutual 
recognition into something that must first be achieved through an antagonistic social and 
historical process that performs an educational function.  
At the beginning of the struggle for recognition portrayed in Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit, each self-consciousness confronts another self-consciousness as a purely natural 
being, and as something whose independence is of essentially the same kind as the 
independence of the object of desire, that is to say, a purely physical form of independence: 
 
Appearing thus immediately on the scene, they are for one another like ordinary 
objects, independent shapes, individuals submerged in the being of Life … They are, 
for each other, shapes of consciousness which have not yet accomplished the 
movement of absolute abstraction, of rooting-out all immediate being, and of being 
the purely negative being of self-identical consciousness.16 
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What, though, is the act or ‘movement’ of ‘absolute abstraction’ mentioned in this passage?  
The reference to ‘rooting-out all immediate being’ suggests that this act corresponds 
to the act of abstraction that is a condition of recognizing others as beings of the same general 
type as oneself and that is in this respect also a condition of the act of freely limiting one’s 
activity in relation to them - an act that one performs in order to be recognized in turn by 
others as a free and rational being - at least in so far as it consists in abstracting from all 
natural features (e.g. physical and racial characteristics, given desires and their objects) that 
differentiate one human being from other human beings or have the potential to do so. The 
act of abstracting from all such features would leave us only with the identity of a self-
consciousness or ‘I’ which unifies all such determinate features within itself (‘the purely 
negative being of self-identical consciousness’). In the first stage of the struggle for 
recognition, however, the object of consciousness is viewed as a being that has not performed 
this act of abstraction. In the case of one of the participants in this struggle, the object of 
consciousness shows itself instead to be ultimately incapable of performing such an act.  
By risking their lives in the struggle for recognition, individuals attempt to 
demonstrate both to themselves and to others that they enjoy the independence which Fichte 
associates with the self-identity of self-consciousness, on the grounds that in positing itself 
the I does not depend on anything external to itself. Rather, it is entirely self-constituting and 
self-determining. In the case of the individual self-consciousness which engages in the 
struggle for recognition, this independence assumes the specific form of the ability to act 
independently of any given desire or any other natural feature that might determine its 
actions. Moreover, at this stage of human consciousness and development it is only by 
entering this struggle that individuals can, according to Hegel, demonstrate their 
independence in this sense both to themselves and to others:  
 
it is only through staking one’s life that freedom is won; only thus is it proved that for 
self-consciousness, its essential being is not [just] being, not the immediate form in 
which it appears, not its submergence in the expanse of life, but rather that there is 
nothing present in it which could not be regarded as a vanishing moment, that it is 
only pure being-for-self.17  
 
This practical demonstration of one’s independence is thereby meant to provide a determinate 
representation of this same independence in the form of another person’s recognition of one’s 
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independence, making this independence into an object of consciousness which is not, 
however, other than the subject of consciousness. In this way, a unity of the moments of 
identity (self-consciousness) and non-identity (consciousness) is achieved. Each self-
consciousness can here be understood to be motivated to enter the struggle for recognition by 
a practical need which generates ‘the drive to show itself as a free self, and to be there as a 
free self to the other’.18 
The act of abstraction on which the achievement of such a determinate representation 
of oneself ultimately depends finds immediate expression in the willingness to risk one’s own 
life by entering into deadly conflict with another human being in an attempt to gain 
recognition of what one takes oneself essentially to be (i.e. an independent being). This 
willingness to risk one’s own life demonstrates that one is independent of all the particular 
natural features that together constitute life, including one’s own life, understood as a whole. 
Yet one of the participants in the struggle for recognition ultimately fails to perform this act 
of abstraction because the fear of death proves to be stronger in the end. This individual 
allows him- or herself thereby to be treated by the other participant as merely a thing and as 
nothing more than the means to the ends of another individual’s desires. This outcome 
generates a problem, however, in that the one who exercises domination cannot recognize 
him- or herself in the object of his or her consciousness, namely, in the human being whom 
he or she dominates. Rather, ‘the object in which the lord has achieved his lordship has in 
reality turned out to be something quite different from an independent consciousness. What 
now really confronts him is not an independent consciousness, but a dependent one’.19  
Given this apparent dead end, there arises not only the question as to how genuine 
recognition of oneself as an independent being, and thus a representation of what one takes 
oneself essentially to be, can be achieved, but also the question as to whether the struggle for 
recognition can, after all, provide a genetic account of relations of mutual recognition in such 
a way as to solve the problem identified above in connection with Fichte’s deduction of the 
concept of right. In relation to the second issue in particular, Hegel introduces a type of 
reversal in which the one who is dominated turns out to achieve the capacity for self-
determination, that is, not only the capacity for independence but also the capacity to 
constrain one’s own activity through an act of free choice. As we have seen, the latter is, in 
the form of the capacity to limit one’s own activity in relation to others, a condition of the act 
of self-negation expressed by means of a summons described by Fichte. This capacity is 
developed by means of the discipline required of an individual who must labour in 
accordance with the demands of a master, as opposed to doing something simply because he 
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or she happens to desire to do it. Hegel accordingly describes work as ‘desire held in 
check’.20 In an addition to the corresponding paragraph of his Encyclopaedia he is recorded 
as even saying that the discipline imposed by relations of domination constitutes ‘the 
beginning of genuine human freedom’, because the human being who is dominated learns not 
to act according to his or her immediate desires; and if such self-discipline is a necessary 
condition of the development of the capacity for self-determination – and with it the 
possibility of an act of self-limitation - it follows that without ‘having experienced the 
discipline that breaks self-will, no one becomes free, rational, and capable of command’.21  
From this type of claim it can be seen that the reversal in question is meant to 
demonstrate that although risking one’s life by engaging in the struggle for recognition 
satisfies a necessary condition of mutual recognition, namely, the consciousness of oneself as 
an independent being which is not immediately determined by its natural desires or drives, it 
cannot be a sufficient condition of such recognition. Indeed, the way in which it generates 
relations of domination already shows this. In any case, even this necessary condition is only 
partially satisfied, because the independence in question does not become an object of 
consciousness in the form of the recognition accorded to oneself by another human being in 
whom one’s own sense of independence is adequately mirrored. As we have just seen, 
another necessary condition is the development of the capacity to limit one’s drive for 
independence in relation to others, and this is something that cannot be achieved by someone 
who possesses absolute power in relation to others and is therefore free to treat and to use 
them in accordance with his or her immediately given desires or drives.  
The possibility of alternative ways of becoming the type of being to which a summons 
can be addressed and that is capable of summoning others by limiting its own activity in 
relation to them may be thought to undermine the following claim that Hegel makes: ‘The 
individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a person, but he has not 
attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness’.22 We should 
not, however, lose sight of the specific problem inherited from Fichte with which Hegel is 
attempting to deal. In the light of this problem, the struggle for recognition can be thought to 
be necessary on account of the discipline to which it subjects individuals and thereby makes 
them capable of limiting their own activity in relation to others. Only then can there be 
alternative ways of becoming the type of being to which a summons can be addressed and 
that is capable of summoning others by limiting its own activity in relation to them. 
Moreover, the experience of having risked one’s own life is a necessary, if not sufficient, 
condition of the formation of the type of consciousness with which Hegel associates the very 
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beginnings of human freedom. In the case of the bondsman, this experience is preserved even 
if the fear of death proved stronger in the end, for ‘this consciousness has been fearful, not of 
this or that particular thing or just at odd moments, but its whole being has been seized with 
dread; for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord. In that experience it has 
been quite unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything solid and stable 
has been shaken to its foundations’.23  
Under different historical and social conditions, the educative process which human 
beings must undergo could take another form, such as that of socialization within a 
community in which relations of mutual recognition already generally obtain in the form of 
the legal recognition that both Fichte and Hegel associate with right. Indeed, in his Elements 
of the Philosophy of Right Hegel maintains that the struggle for recognition and the relations 
of domination associated with it concern only the ‘immediate consciousness of freedom’ 
characteristic of a condition in which ‘the human being exists as a natural being and as a 
concept which has being only in itself’, whereas ‘the Idea of freedom is truly present only as 
the state’.24 The reasoning behind this set of claims becomes clearer if one recalls what I have 
already said concerning what motivated Hegel’s account of the struggle for recognition, 
namely, the need to provide a genetic account of relations of mutual recognition which 
explains how it was possible for human beings to establish such relations among themselves 
when the first human beings, who are assumed to be originally purely natural beings, must be 
thought to have lacked the relevant capacities and self-conception. Yet once the required 
capacities and self-conception have been sufficiently developed in at least some human 
beings, they can educate others in such a way that they develop the same capacities and self-
conception, making the struggle for recognition unnecessary and, moreover, unjust, in that it 
violates legal, social and political norms and their institutional embodiments that have come 
to be generally recognized as valid.  
In relation to the last point, it is significant that in the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel 
claims that the individual who has not risked his life may nevertheless be recognized as a 
person and thereby appears to treat the term ‘person’ as signifying something that falls short 
of what is required of a truly independent self-consciousness. In the Philosophy of Right, the 
person forms the subject of the first moment of right, which Hegel calls ‘abstract right’. The 
concept of the person here broadly corresponds to the legal subject of Fichte’s doctrine or 
theory of right (Rechtslehre). For Fichte, the person exercises freedom of choice within a 
legally recognized sphere that must ultimately be guaranteed by the state (GA I/3: 361; FNR, 
53). Given that the person exercises freedom of choice and recognizes the rights of others to 
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exercise it, personality by its very nature presupposes the capacity for self-determination and 
self-limitation. In this respect, it also presupposes that each and every person has been the 
object of a summons and, in so far as a genetic account of a community in which human 
beings can be the object of a summons is concerned, that the type of struggle for recognition 
described by Hegel is already over. Persons can conceive of themselves as independent of 
any purely natural, given features that distinguish them from others and can therefore adopt a 
reflective stance towards such features; indeed, it is the possibility of doing so that makes 
them independent of these features. Legal recognition requires in addition that persons 
exercise self-determination not only through the ends that they adopt and act upon but also by 
limiting their freedom in relation to others, thereby recognizing the right of others to act in 
accordance with their own ends.  
For Hegel, personality begins with the subject’s ‘consciousness of itself as a 
completely abstract “I” in which all concrete limitation and validity are negated and 
invalidated’, and when ‘there is knowledge of the self as an object, but as an object raised by 
thought to simple infinity and hence purely identical with itself’.25 Yet personality is also 
‘that which acts to overcome [aufzuheben] this limitation and to give itself reality – or, what 
amounts to the same thing, to posit that existence [Dasein] as its own’.26 The limitation in 
question is that of being something merely subjective, and the existence that the person seeks 
to posit as its own is therefore one that can be taken to involve a change in, or appropriation 
of, parts of the external, material world confronting it. Thus the person is not only abstractly 
free but also seeks to realize its freedom in the world through the exercise of free choice, the 
initial objects of which are external things that it makes into its property.  
If personality is an achievement - as both Hegel’s account of the struggle for 
recognition and the role of the summons in Fichte’s deduction of the concept of right imply it 
is - the question arises as to how ages in which relations of mutual recognition were either 
completely or in large part absent are to be judged from the standpoint of an age in which 
such relations obtain or in which the general need for them has at least been acknowledged. 
Since slavery represents a clear example of the absence of recognition,27 I shall now turn to 
some things that Fichte and Hegel have to say about it so as to determine how they must be 
thought to answer this question. Although their commitment to the idea of the necessity of 
mutual recognition, either as a condition of self-consciousness or as a condition of 
overcoming the alienation that accompanies the unresolved opposition between subjectivity 
and objectivity, suggests that they must condemn slavery unconditionally, we shall see that 
the matter is, in fact, less clear-cut than this. 
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Fichte and Hegel on slavery 
In his account of abstract right, Hegel draws a distinction between persons and things. A 
thing lacks personality and cannot, therefore, be a bearer of rights.28 This is because a thing 
by its very nature lacks the capacities (freedom and rationality) that Hegel associates with 
personality. Slavery, by reducing a person to the status of a thing which is the property of a 
person who has the right to dispose of it as he or she pleases, is inherently unjust because it 
treats persons as things. Hegel describes the slave as someone whose ‘entire scope of … 
activity had been alienated to his master’.29 In other words, the slave is in no position at all to 
exercise self-determination through the free use of his or her powers, unlike the person who 
has alienated these powers through an act of free choice and only for a limited period of time 
by means of a contract. Thus slavery represents a radical example of the alienation of 
personality.30  
Hegel rejects all justifications of slavery based on contingent factors or events (e.g. 
surrendering in battle, being the child of a slave). Rather, he seeks to comprehend the 
institution of slavery in terms of what a human being essentially is. Slavery depends on 
conceiving a human being ‘simply as a natural being whose existence … is not in conformity 
with his concept’. 31  I take Hegel to mean ‘natural’ in the sense of being motivated by 
considerations such as the fear of death or in the sense of being born with a certain character 
or particular social status (e.g. being by nature fearful or cowardly, being born the son or 
daughter of someone who is already a slave). The claim that slavery is wrong, by contrast, is 
based on ‘the concept of the human being as spirit, as something free in itself’.32 Given his 
accounts of recognition and personality, one may well expect the last claim to represent 
Hegel’s own viewpoint. He criticizes this viewpoint, however, on the grounds that it regards 
the human being ‘as by nature free, or (and this amounts to the same thing) takes the concept 
as such in its immediacy’.33 This criticism can be related to a feature of his account of the 
struggle for recognition, namely, that freedom (and therefore personality) is an achievement 
(at both an individual and collective level), as opposed to something merely given. This 
brings me to a further point.  
Hegel associates general recognition of personality specifically with a certain 
historical epoch. This epoch marks the transition from the ancient to the modern world and it 
begins with the rise of Christianity: ‘It must be nearly one and a half millennia since the 
freedom of personality began to flourish under Christianity and became a universal principle 
for part – if only a small part – of the human race’.34 Hegel could be interpreted as saying 
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both of the following two things: (1) that in other ages, cultures or societies consciousness of 
personality was (or is) lacking and (2) that slavery in such ages, cultures or societies cannot 
therefore be condemned in absolute moral terms. Clearly, (2) is not entailed by (1), since a 
description of the absence of something in another age, culture and society does not exclude 
moral condemnation of this age, culture and society on account of its failure to recognize the 
rights or value of something. Hegel’s acceptance of (2) is nevertheless suggested by his claim 
that criticism of slavery becomes possible only at the higher stage of consciousness and 
development presupposed by his own Philosophy of Right, for only then can the limitations 
of this institution be properly comprehended. This claim can be detected in the following 
statement: ‘Slavery occurs in the transitional phase between natural human existence and the 
truly ethical condition; it occurs in a world where a wrong is still right. Here, the wrong is 
valid, so that the position it occupies is a necessary one’.35 
This viewpoint is compatible with the idea of the necessity of the struggle for 
recognition at a certain point in social history. Yet it also raises a problem: if individuals 
lacked personality at a certain point in time, how could they have ever come to alienate their 
personality by becoming slaves, given that any act of alienation presupposes the freedom to 
dispose of what is one’s own, and in this way presupposes in turn that one already has a 
consciousness of oneself as a person? In other words, the essential connection that Hegel, 
following Fichte, makes between personality and the exercise of free choice implies that 
alienating one’s personality must itself be an act that is freely performed, for otherwise it 
would simply not be a case of the alienation of personality itself. If we view this problem in 
relation to Hegel’s account of the struggle for recognition and its immediate outcome, 
however, one can view personality itself as a by-product of this struggle together with the 
domination and discipline suffered by human beings as a result of preferring life to 
independence. As the consciousness of personality develops and spreads, the institution of 
slavery must gradually come to appear more and more unjust and the incentive to abolish it 
will become correspondingly greater and more widespread.  
Although Hegel appears to identify the wish to demonstrate their independence of 
anything naturally given as that which immediately motivates the struggle for recognition, we 
have seen that this way of demonstrating one’s independence is not the only way of securing 
recognition, even if it was so at a certain point in social history. Another way of gaining 
recognition is by means of legal relations which apply to all and are guaranteed by a state 
which recognizes all its citizens as equals. Thus, the notion of being a ‘person’ is regarded 
with contempt at the stage of the consciousness of freedom represented by the struggle for 
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recognition only because freedom is here identified with independence alone and not with the 
legally guaranteed status of personhood that, once achieved, means that the willingness to 
risk one’s own life in a life-or-death struggle for recognition is no longer a condition of 
recognition. The problem remains, nevertheless, that if a human being who engaged in the 
struggle for recognition but preferred life to independence must be thought to lack the 
consciousness of personality as well as legal recognition, it is not clear how this individual 
can be held responsible for his or her slavery, in the sense that he or she has freely alienated 
his or her personality. Yet when Hegel claims that ‘if someone is a slave, his own will is 
responsible’,36 he must be taken to mean that this human being had a consciousness of his 
independence and personality in the sense of an awareness of him- or herself as a being that 
is not immediately determined by natural desires and drives, but failed to demonstrate the 
reality of this self-conception through his or her actions, including the act of asserting his or 
her independence by risking his or her own life. This is itself a harsh conclusion, however, 
when applied to ages in which the struggle to preserve or first gain one’s independence would 
not have been facilitated by existing forms of legal recognition, and when individuals would 
have had a hard time developing the relevant self-conception in the absence of this form of 
recognition and on account of the condition of servitude in which they found themselves. 
Some of Fichte’s remarks on slavery also point in the direction of the claim that the 
slave is personally responsible for his or her servitude without, however, its being possible to 
make clear sense of such a claim. In his System of Ethics, Fichte claims that cowardice, 
understood as the ‘laziness that prevents us from asserting our freedom and self-sufficiency 
[Selbstständigkeit] in our interaction [Wechselwirkung] with others’, provides ‘the only 
explanation for slavery among human beings, both physical and moral’ (GA I/5: 185; SE, 
192). Physical slavery, which is closest to the historical forms of slavery that concern us here, 
is said to have its source in a willingness to yield to the greater force of others simply because 
resistance would require too much effort and pain.  
The fact that Fichte regards the failure to resist superior physical force as morally 
reprehensible even when resistance is likely to result in one’s own death is shown by how he 
compares the person who commits suicide unfavourably with the virtuous person who 
endures the evils he or she suffers, but nevertheless regards the former person as a hero ‘in 
comparison with the abject person who subjects himself to shame and slavery simply in order 
to prolong for a few more years the miserable feeling of his own existence’ (GA I/5: 240; SE, 
257). Fichte appears to assume, then, that slaves are morally responsible for the domination 
to which they are subject because it was, and remains, possible for them to resist it and 
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thereby to assert their independence, whereas they did not (or do not) choose to do so through 
cowardice and the fear of death. This argument is problematic in at least two respects, beyond 
the fact that it places what are arguably unduly rigorous demands on human beings, demands 
to which some human beings have found themselves subject in virtue of such factors as race 
and their inability to defend themselves in the face of overwhelming physical force, whereas 
others have simply had the good fortune never to be subject to the same demands.  
The first problem is that the laziness in terms of which Fichte explains the cowardice 
which allegedly accounts for the possibility of slavery forms part of his account of the 
condition of radical evil in which the natural human being finds him- or herself. Given that 
the natural condition is one in which human beings lack a clear consciousness of their 
freedom, it is difficult to explain, as Fichte himself recognizes, how they could ever escape 
this condition, when doing so would itself require an act of freedom on the part of beings that 
are held to be unaware of their capacity for freedom.37 This in turn invites the question as to 
how a human being who had never left the natural condition, or had somehow returned to it, 
could be held morally responsible for the laziness which prevents him or her from resisting 
others in an attempt to avoid physical or moral slavery.  
The second problem more directly concerns Fichte’s account of recognition. As we 
have seen, the consciousness of oneself as free ultimately depends on being the object of a 
summons, which can take the form of an educative process or the form of legal recognition. 
Thus, if someone has not been subject to the right kind of educative process or is not 
accorded legal recognition, he or she would not, it seems, be in the position to become 
conscious of his or her freedom in the sense of the capacity to exercise self-determination, 
even if the desire for natural freedom in the sense of the absence of external constraints might 
nevertheless explain why a slave would be motivated to seek to escape the servitude to which 
he or she is subject. A slave could not, therefore, be held to be morally responsible for his or 
her failure as a person, as opposed to a purely natural being, to resist others in an attempt to 
avoid physical or moral slavery. 
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